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Abstract 
We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under 
varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval 
between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions 
and their outcomes. This effect is known as ‘intentional binding’, and may provide feedback 
regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, 
our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 
1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3). 
Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related 
(Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual’s explicit appraisal of exertion, while 
the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated 
(physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of 
intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through 
physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct 
sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource 
depletion and action control during strain. 
  
Keywords: Sense of agency, temporal binding, intentional binding, experience of 
effort, time perception. 
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Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency 
It is important that the human motor system can efficiently process events which are 
the result of its own actions, and to discriminate these from events in the world for which it is 
not responsible. For instance, if I kick a ball and it knocks over and smashes a vase of 
flowers, I know my action of kicking the ball was responsible for the vase smashing. Self-
authored events like this tend to be easy to identify and this feeling that ‘I did it’ is known as 
a sense of agency. Some actions are more effortful than others; kicking a ball as hard as one 
can might break a vase, but so might brushing one’s arm against it as one walks past it 
precariously positioned near the edge of a table. Both these actions have the same outcome, 
but might require the action monitoring system to respond differently in order to correctly 
ascribe agency. Here, we tested the role of physical and mental effort on the ascription of 
sense of agency, using an implicit measure. 
The attribution of agency 
Self-agency is detected where there are cues relating to intentionality, volition, 
predictability and contiguity. An interesting phenomena occurring under these conditions is 
that actions and their effects are perceived as occurring closer together in time than they did, 
an effect known as temporal or intentional binding (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Engbert & 
Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Haggard, Clark & 
Kalogeras, 2002; see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). One theory of subjective time 
perception suggests that ‘ticks’ of an ‘internal clock’ give rise to our sense of time passing. 
The pace of this clock varies with arousal and motor activity (Gibbon, Church & Meck, 1984; 
Treisman, 1963; Wearden Pilkington & Carter, 1999). When the pace of neural ‘ticks’ slows, 
durations appear shorter due to the accumulations of fewer pacing ‘ticks’. Conversely, when 
the pace of the ‘ticks’ quickens, durations appear longer. Contexts characteristic of self-
agency are believed to slow the pace of the internal clock as a consequence of motor 
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prediction. This results in the shortening of subjective time and temporal binding (Wenke & 
Haggard, 2009). This may be an adaptive process to help to create a sense of agency, and in a 
general sense this process could assist the sensorimotor system to identify and monitor its 
effects and optimise performance (Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2015; Wenke & Haggard, 2009). 
Several accounts as to how agency is attributed to the self have been suggested, 
including the forward predictive comparator model (Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 2001; 
Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004), the post-hoc 
inference account (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), and the optimal cue integration account 
(Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). The comparator model 
provides a predictive account of agency attribution, characterised by the comparison between 
predicted action effects with actual action effects. Congruence between these effects results in 
perceived self-authorship and a sense of agency, whereas incongruence results in diminished 
sense of agency. 
An alternative model, the post-hoc inference account, provides a post-dictive re-
constructionist account of agency attribution. Here, sense of agency self-attribution is 
dependent upon reflection on the action-effect relationship after the outcome has occurred. 
For instance, when there is an intention to act, when the perceived effects can be explained by 
the intended action, and when there is no other plausible cause for the effect, sense of agency 
is then experienced and retrospectively introduced into consciousness. Finally, the optimal 
cue integration account recognises the importance of both pre- and post-dictive cues. These 
cues are then weighted for their reliability for agency attribution depending on the context 
and then used to determine self-authorship. The ability to construct these cues and make 
comparisons between expected and actual effects of actions may depend on the availability of 
cognitive resources. Indeed, diminished attentional resources have been shown to impair 
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explicit ratings of agency (Hon, Poh, & Soon, 2013). Moreover, studies concerning cognitive 
load, kinematics and motor awareness offer support to this prediction. Dual task paradigms 
employing mental arithmetic, memory tasks and fine motor movements during balance, gait, 
posture and walking tasks have shown reductions in motor control and motor awareness 
(Kannape, Barré, Aminian & Blanke, 2014; Lindenberger, Marsiske & Baltes, 2000; 
Woollacott & Shumway-Cook, 2002). Dual task performance models suggest that motor 
control and cognitive activity compete for cognitive resources (Huxhold, Li, Schmiedek & 
Lindenberger, 2006; Lacour, Bernard-Demanze & Dumitrescu, 2008). In such cases motor 
control and awareness become less efficient due to cross-domain resource competition. The 
deficits in motor awareness caused by limited cognitive resources are especially of relevance 
to the sense of agency as, in accordance with the forward models of motor control, it is a 
crucial factor in the ability to monitor self-initiated actions. This cognitive resource limitation 
notion therefore has interesting implications regarding the role cognitive resource availability 
may have on constructing the attribution of agency. 
Mental and Physical Effort 
We are concerned primarily with how effort might influence the implicit sense of 
agency. It is important then to note that despite appearing to be independent concepts, 
physical and mental effort similarly put strain on the cognitive system by expending 
cognitive resources (Dietrich, 2003; Dietrich & Sparling, 2004; Franconeri, Alverez & 
Cavanagh, 2013). Mental and physical effort therefore draw from and deplete a common 
cognitive resource. It is also important to note that exertion influences perception in other 
domains. For instance, perceived distance increases and hills seem steeper under conditions 
requiring more physical exertion (e.g. when carrying a heavy load; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; 
Sugovic & Witt, 2013; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). These apparent spatial distortions as a 
function of required effort are also mirrored for the perception of time. 
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A recent meta-analysis investigating the effect of physical load on duration 
judgements revealed that physical workload results in longer perceived durations (Block, 
Hancock & Zakay, 2016; seven studies spanning from 1963 – 2011). However, the impact of 
effort on perceived duration need not be experiential, as stimuli that allude to motion, action, 
or exertion also elongate perceived durations. For example, faster moving non-biological 
stimuli are perceived to last longer than slower moving stimuli (Brown, 1995; Kaneko & 
Murakami, 2009), and the perceived duration of images of ballet dancer statues are 
lengthened when the poses reflected greater levels of exertion (Nather, Bueno, Bigand & 
Droit-Volet, 2011). The elongation of subjective time as a result of effort are also found for 
mental activity. Depleted attentional resources and increased cognitive load result in longer 
retrospective subjective time judgements (for a review see Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010). 
Given these findings highlighting the similarities between the effects of physical and mental 
effort on time perception, one can hypothesise that physical and mental exertion could have 
similar disruptive effects on temporal measures of the sense of agency, driven by the 
depletion of cognitive resources (Dietrich, 2003; Dietrich & Sparling, 2004, Franconeri et al., 
2013; Hon et al., 2013). 
Sense of agency and effort 
Given what we know about the effects of physical and mental exertion on 
performance and perception, and assuming that ascribing agency is a costly cognitive 
process, the hypothesis follows that agency should be reduced under conditions of mental or 
physical effort. There is some support for this hypothesis from a study using an explicit 
measure, where participants reported the degree to which they felt agency over an event (Hon 
et al., 2013). These authors found that explicit ratings of agency over a dot that moved 
following an arrow key press were reduced under conditions of high cognitive load, which 
was manipulated using a working memory task. This is an interesting finding but converging 
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evidence using an implicit task would be valuable in understanding the processes involved in 
agency attribution during strain. This is especially important given that explicit and implicit 
measures are sometimes found to be dissociated (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Obhi & Hall; 
2011).  
Some studies that have used implicit measures lend indirect support to the notion that 
mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency, though their research questions did not 
directly address the role of cognitive load. Specifically, temporal binding for self-actions has 
been shown to be weaker when the outcome of the action is socially negative (Yoshie & 
Haggard, 2013), or when the actor performs the action under coercion (Caspar, Christensen, 
Cleeremans & Haggard, 2016). Individual ratings of agency over outcomes to actions have 
also shown to be lower when there is conflict in action selection caused by distractor stimuli 
(Sidarus & Haggard, 2016). Indeed, each of these acts imply a significant degree of cognitive 
conflict (see Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen, 2004), which would make their 
findings appear broadly in line with our hypothesis.  
A general explanation of these effects could be drawn from the effect of resource 
depletion on time perception. As noted above, subjective time lengthens under load (Block, et 
al., 2010; 2016), which would result in less temporal binding (i.e. smaller underestimation 
errors) in agency conditions due to the resources required to bind the action and its effect 
together already being committed to the cognitively effortful primary task. However, the only 
research to have directly addressed cognitive effort during the task itself used an explicit 
measure (Hon et al. 2013), as did the research inducing conflict in action selection (Sidarus & 
Haggard, 2016). The work by Caspar et al. (2016) and Yoshie and Haggard (2011), although 
employing implicit measures, manipulated the outcome of, or the motivation for, the action, 
rather than the effort context under which the action itself was performed. Therefore, a direct 
test of how effort influences agency using an implicit measure would be valuable in 
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understanding the processes involved in agency attribution during strain, and determining if 
effort affects interval estimation measures of sense of agency in a comparable way to explicit 
ratings previous found (Hon et al., 2013). 
One recent study has more directly investigated the effect of physical effort exerted 
during the action, using an implicit measure (Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, Blotenberg & 
Brass, 2013). Levels of physical task-unrelated effort were manipulated so that the arm 
contralateral to the active hand used to carry out the time perception measure held an exercise 
resistance band. The authors used the ‘Libet clock’ method in which participants attempted to 
state where the hand on an analogue clock face had been both when they performed their 
action (a key press) and also when they heard the consequent tone. They compared these 
trials to baseline trials in which either only a key press occurred or only a tone sounded. In 
contrast to predictions one could derive from the above discussed research, Demanet et al. 
found that greater effort increased temporal binding, therefore implying a stronger implicit 
sense of agency under conditions of high task-unrelated physical effort. These findings were 
attributed to the notion that effortful actions boost the interoceptive sensory-motor 
information of willed effort, which may act as a cue to self-agency (Haggard et al., 2002; 
Lafargue & Franck, 2009; Vierkant, 2014).  
The pattern of data observed by Demanet et al. (2013) and the conclusion drawn 
accord with Maine de Biran’s hypothesis (1805, as cited in Demanet et al.) that effort is a cue 
to identify self-agency. This explanation is convincing and a good account of their finding of 
enhanced temporal binding under effort. Nevertheless, their finding is contrary to what one 
might predict given that it is known that physical effort depletes cognitive resources, which is 
associated with time expansion, not compression, and that the depletion of cognitive 
resources reduces motor control and awareness - elements fundamental for agency ascription 
(Block et al., 2010; Block et al., 2016; Huxhold et al., 2006; Kannape et al., 2014). Hence, it 
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might be expected that the opposite effect would be observed; that exertion would result in 
disrupted – not enhanced - intentional binding. If the role of effort in reducing cognitive 
resources specifically disrupts the ascription of agency – rather than a general disruption of 
time perception - then it can be expected that effort will not have a similar disruptive effect 
during a passive control task in which agency is absent. To provide evidence that can help to 
establish the role of effort in implicit agency, we present three experiments that for the first 
time to our knowledge investigate the effect of task-related physical effort, and in further 
experiments, task-unrelated physical and mental effort, on implicit agency attributions. 
The current study 
To determine whether physical and mental effort modulate agency over actions and 
their outcomes, a temporal binding paradigm measuring implicit agency was used. In 
particular, an interval reproduction paradigm, previously demonstrated to successfully show 
temporal binding in agentic tasks (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & 
Haggard, 2008; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013), was used here 
to measure implicit sense of agency. Experiments 1 and 2 investigate the role of task-related 
and task-unrelated physical effort on agency, respectively. In this way, Experiment 2 is a 
close replication of Demanet et al. (2013), except that we use an interval reproduction method 
of intentional binding and they used the ‘Libet clock’ method. Experiment 3 extends the 
examination of the effects of effort for sense of agency to the cognitive domain, investigating 
the role of mental effort in the form of cognitive load, for the ascription of agency. 
Experiment 3 can be compared with Hon et al, (2013) who investigated explicit measures of 
agency under varying load. 
We believe these studies are the first to investigate the role of task-related physical 
effort on implicit agency. Moreover, these experiments are the first to investigate the 
influence of physical and mental effort on sense of agency using the interval reproduction 
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paradigm. Mental effort has also not before been directly investigated for its role in 
modulating implicit agency. Therefore, these features of our approach and design afford a 
more direct appraisal of different sources of effort on the implicit sense of agency than has 
been undertaken previously.  
Given the common effects of physical and mental effort depleting cognitive resources, 
we can predict that high effort will result in a decrease in temporal binding across physical 
and mental effort in agentic conditions. However, the only previous study to investigate 
physical effort and sense of agency, found the converse effect, that high effort increased 
implicit agency (Demanet et al., 2013). Our investigation therefore also aims to clarify 
whether there is a general effect of effort on agency, or whether the specific context and 
source of the effort plays a critical role in the extent to which an implcit sense of agency is 
generated.  
Experiment 1: Task-related physical effort 
The first experiment was designed to test the effects of task-related effort on implicit 
sense of agency. Participants made temporal reproductions of intervals between their action 
(depression of a key) and the consequence (a tone) whilst under low or high task-related 
physical effort, i.e. the arm under effort was the arm performing the actions and interval 
reproduction task. If effort acts as a cue that the self is acting in the environment, and 
therefore increases the sense of agency that the action generates, then greater temporal 
binding between actions and consequences whilst under high effort are expected. 
Alternatively, if effort depletes cognitive resources responsible for generating the agency 
signal, then more effortful actions will produce weaker temporal binding. We also asked 
participants to provide ratings of the subjective effort they exerted under low and high effort 
in order to allow us to examine relationships between subjective effort and agency. 
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Method 
The following applies to all three experiments. We report how we determined our 
sample size and all data exclusions (if any). We also report all manipulations and all measures 
in each experiment (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). Our target sample size for each 
experiment was n = 36 based on Demanet et al. (2013), who tested a similar research 
question. We have also calculated that to achieve medium effect sizes (i.e. ηp2 = .06, r = 0.5, 
dz = 0.5 at Power = 0.8, = .05), a sample of n = 32 was required. Our stopping rule was to 
aim for n = 36, but to stop near that number for convenience at the end of a run of laboratory 
bookings. We excluded single trials from all three experiments where the participant 
produced extreme interval reproductions (>3SD from the individual’s mean). We excluded 
participants if their mean reproduction errors were >3SD from the group mean.  
Participants 
Thirty-five participants aged 18-51 years (M = 22.2 years, SD = 7.79; six were men), 
recruited from the University of East Anglia, completed the experiment in return for payment 
or course credit. Participants gave informed consent and were naïve as to the research 
question. Because the experiment involved exertion while holding a latex exercise band, 
individuals with a latex allergy, or back, neck, arm or shoulder pain were excluded from 
participation. No participants met these exclusion criteria. The study was approved by the 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee, University of East Anglia.  
Apparatus & Stimuli 
Physical effort was manipulated using Thera-Band® latex resistance bands which are 
typically used for exercise. The levels of effort were operationalised using two different 
resistance bands. This allowed for “Low” and “High” effort conditions using Thera-Bands® 
in colours yellow and blue, respectively. The amount of force required to hold the bands in 
the required position was approximately 24.5N and 4.9N for the high and low effort bands, 
 EFFORT DISRUPTS IMPLICIT AGENCY  
 
 
12 
respectively. The bands were attached to a handrail that was fixed to the wall behind the 
participants, 94cm from the ground, positioned off to the right so that the band was pulled 
past the participant’s trunk and held in the right hand over the space bar. 
The position of the keyboard from the center of the space bar was approximately 40 
cm from the front edge of the table. The height of the table was 71 cm. A tone (150ms, 
440Hz; created using Audacity® software) was presented using Logitech speakers. Visual 
stimuli were presented (black text on a white background) using E-Prime® software on a 
Dell 1909W monitor (size: 19 inches; resolution: 1440 x 900; refresh rate: 60 Hz).  
Design  
In a 2x2 repeated subjects design participants completed four experimental block 
types differing across two factors: “Presence of Agency” (“Agency” and “No Agency”) and 
“Physical Effort” (“Low” and “High”). The dependent measure was duration reproduction 
error, derived as the actual interval minus the reproduced interval (ms). Participants also rated 
how much effort they experienced whilst holding the low and high effort bands in the 
required position both before (“Pre”) and after (“Post”) the experimental blocks (scale from 
1-10; 1 indicating low effort).  
Procedure 
Presence of Agency manipulation. Instances of agency were manipulated using an 
Interval Reproduction task (Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013) in 
which participants were instructed that a tone would occur after a first event: either a self-
initiated spacebar press with their index finger (“Agency”) or after a first auditory tone (“No 
Agency”). The stimulus interval was the delay between the first event and the outcome 
(randomised between 500-1500ms; as in Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Poonian & 
Cunnington, 2013). Participants were immediately prompted to make response intervals by 
depressing the spacebar with their index finger for the duration they perceived the stimulus 
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interval to have lasted, after which a fixation cross was presented for 1000 ms and the trial 
ended (see Figure 1 for the Interval Reproduction task procedure).  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Effort manipulation. Throughout the interval reproduction task the level of physical 
effort was manipulated by having participants hold the end of a resistance band (“Low” or 
“High”) with their right hand, in a fixed position with their arm outstretched towards the 
spacebar which sat approximately 40cm from the table edge. This allowed for task-related 
induction of effort (we investigate task-unrelated effort in Experiment 2; see Figure 2 for the 
effort manipulation set-up). Participants were instructed before each block of trials as to 
which band to hold. After each block participants were encouraged to take self-paced rest 
periods. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Before starting the experiment participants completed a short practice block involving 
the “Presence of Agency” and “Physical Effort” manipulations. The experiment consisted of 
eight blocks (two blocks per condition) of 20 trials per block. Each experimental condition 
therefore contained 40 trials. Condition order, manipulated across blocks, was 
counterbalanced so that one block of each condition was presented in the first half (blocks 1-
4) and the second half of the experiment (blocks 5-8). The blocks in the first half of the 
experiment were counterbalanced with each possible order run through. The blocks in the 
second-half backwards mirrored the condition order in the first half. The experiment 
comprised 160 trials and typically took approximately 45 minutes. 
Effort manipulation check. The effort manipulation was successful. This was 
confirmed by examining the effort ratings that participants gave to each band before and after 
the experiment in a 2 (“Physical Effort”; “Low” and “High”) X 2 (“Time”; “Pre” and “Post”) 
ANOVA. The main effect of ‘Physical Effort’ was significant, F(1, 34) = 522.76, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .94, due to higher effort ratings for the “High” compared with the “Low” effort 
resistance band (M = 6.83, SD = 1.38 and M = 2.26, SD = 0.71, respectively). The main effect 
of ‘Time’ was non-significant, F(1, 34) = 1.4, p =.25, ηp2 = .04. The interaction was 
significant, F(1, 34) = 33.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, because the difference in ratings between 
high and low effort bands was larger after, compared with before, the experiment (Low effort 
band: “Pre”: M = 2.49, SD = 1.01; “Post”: M = 2.03, SD = .82; t(34) = 2.31 p = .027, dz = 
0.39; High effort band: “Pre”: M = 6.43, SD = 1.46; “Post”: M = 7.23, SD = 1.46; t(34) = 4.91 
p < .001, dz = 0.83).  
Results 
Trials with extreme reproduction errors were removed (0.48% of trials). Mean 
reproduction errors for each participant in each condition (see Figure 3) were analysed using 
a 2 (“Presence of Agency”) X 2 (“Physical Effort”) ANOVA, revealing significant main 
effects of both of these factors: F(1, 34) = 54.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .62, and F(1, 34) = 14.43, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .3, respectively. These main effects were due to larger reproduction errors - 
more underestimation - in the “Agency” condition than the “No Agency” condition, (M = -
322 ms, SD = 236 and M = -56ms, SD = 265, respectively). This replicates the basic temporal 
binding effect (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 
2010; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). There were larger reproduction errors in the ‘low’ effort 
compared with ‘high’ effort conditions, M = -208 ms, SD = 230 and M = -170 ms, SD = 228, 
respectively. However, the critical interaction was non-significant, F(1, 34) = 2.12, p =.154, 
ηp2 = .06. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 Although the interaction – critical to our research question – was non-significant, we 
nevertheless performed two planned contrasts to investigate the nature of effects across 
“Presence of Agency” and “Physical Effort”. In the “Agency” condition, reproduction errors 
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were significantly larger under “Low” than “High” effort, t(34) = 3.46, p = .001, dz = 0.589, 
while this effect was not significant in the no agency condition, t(34) = 1.59, p = .122, dz = 
0.27. Therefore, due to a non-significant interaction, the overall results do not support our 
hypothesis that reproduction errors in agency tasks would be reduced under greater physical 
effort. 
As a supplementary analysis, we considered that individual susceptibility to the effort 
manipulation may play a critical role in determining the extent to which task-related effort 
might influence the implicit sense of agency. We therefore firstly determined the difference in 
effort ratings that participants gave to the low and high effort bands (averaged over ratings 
they gave pre- and post-experiment). Therefore, people who experienced a great deal of 
difference between how much effort they required to extend the high-effort band versus the 
low-effort band would have a high “Effort Differential” score, whereas people who felt that 
both bands required relatively similar exertion to maintain the extended position would have 
a low “Effort Differential” score. We examined whether this “Effort Differential” measure 
correlated with the “Reproduction Error Differential”: the difference in temporal binding 
between agency and no agency conditions under high vs. low effort conditions (i.e. [Agency 
High – No Agency High] – [Agency Low – No Agency Low]). A Pearson correlation 
revealed a significant positive relationship between the two variables, r(33) = .523, p = .001 
(see Figure 4), whereby as “Effort Differential” increases, so does “Reproduction Error 
Differential”. This correlation is also significant if we only consider the post-experiment 
ratings (r = .436, p = .009). This means that only participants who felt the difference in effort 
they were exerting also showed an effect of effort on the implicit measure of agency. Overall, 
therefore, although the key interaction in the analysis was non-significant, this correlation 
clearly shows that this was related to the individual perception of the effort itself. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Finally, we briefly report here a further analysis prompted by a reviewer (whom we 
thank for the suggestion), indicates an important role of duration of effort on agency. 
Specifically, we found that the reduction of temporal binding under high effort was stronger 
during the second half of trials (i.e. after the arm had been under strain for some time) than in 
the first half. This finding was supported by the outcome of a 3-way ANOVA with Presence 
of Agency, Effort, and the new factor Time on Task (1st half of trials vs. 2nd half of trials) as 
within-subject factors. The critical three way interaction was significant, F(1, 32) = 5.73, p 
=.023, ηp2 = .152. Next, to confirm the source of this 3-way interaction, we conducted 2-way 
ANOVAs on the two halves separately. The 2-way interaction was not significant during the 
1st half of trials, F(1, 33) = 1.39, p =.248, ηp2 = .04 (like in the overall analysis above). 
However the interaction was significant for trials in the 2nd half of the experiment, F(1, 32) = 
4.473, p =.042, ηp2 = .123. This was due to reduced reproduction errors under high effort 
compared with low effort in “Agency” conditions, t(33) = 4.52, p < .001, dz = 0.78 (M = -
354. SD = 274 and M = -260, SD = 283, respectively). In “No Agency” conditions this effect 
was not observed, t(33) = 1.38, p =.177, dz = 0.24 (M = -47, SD = 286 and M = -24. SD = 
287, respectively. It therefore appears that the effect of high effort on temporal binding 
increases with time on task. 
 Discussion 
Overall, the data indicate agency effects in that there was greater temporal binding 
during conditions in which agency was present, replicating previous work (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). However, there was no reliable difference in the effect of 
agency on interval reproduction errors across different levels of effort. Nevertheless, although 
the critical interaction was indeed non-significant, the contrast between effort levels in 
agency conditions was significant, but in the opposite direction to that found by Demanet et 
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al. (2013). Specifically, there was stronger binding (which implies greater implicit sense of 
agency) under low effort than under high effort. This discrepancy with Demanet et al’s 
finding could be explained by the difference in how implicit agency was measured. We used 
the interval reproduction paradigm, whereas Demanet et al used the Libet clock method. 
However, it is not clear what aspect of these two methods might result in such divergent 
findings. Another key difference between our procedure and that of Demanet and colleagues 
is that the present Experiment 1 involved the participants engaging in task-related effort (the 
hand used to act was under strain) whereas a passive arm was under strain in Demanet et al. 
In Experiment 2 we test whether this latter difference accounts for the disparate findings by 
having our participants engage in task-unrelated effort, like Demanet and colleagues’ 
participants. 
Although the critical agency by effort interaction did not approach significance at the 
group level, we did find a significant medium-sized effect when investigating individual 
appraisals of exertion. Participants who experienced the high effort manipulation as much 
more exertive than the low effort manipulation demonstrated a larger disparity in binding 
difference across the low and high physical effort conditions. We also found a medium-sized 
effect when investigating the build-up of fatigue, such that in the second half of the 
experiment temporal binding was reduced under conditions of agency under high effort. 
Therefore, we are able to draw reasonably strong conclusions from these data overall despite 
the lack of a clear effect at the group- and full session-level; high effort did indeed reduce the 
sense of agency, but only for participants who registered the exertion as more effortful than 
the low effort condition, and also in the second half of the experimental session, after fatigue 
from the effort had set in. Therefore, we are able to draw reasonably strong conclusions from 
these data overall despite the lack of a clear effect at the group-level; high effort did indeed 
reduce the sense of agency, but only for participants who registered the exertion as effortful, 
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or after the build-up of fatigue. We note again here, that these findings are in the context of 
task-related physical effort, so it is important to establish whether these effects (in particular 
the individual differences effect) are specific to task related effort. Therefore, in addition to 
testing conditions closer to Demanet et al. by using task-unrelated effort, Experiment 2 also 
allows us to examine again the influence of individual-level experience on the modulatory 
impact of effort on the sense of agency.  
Experiment 2: Task-unrelated physical effort 
Experiment 2 aimed to investigate whether modulations of temporal binding by effort 
are limited to task-related effort (Experiment 1) by making the effort in this experiment 
unrelated to the interval reproduction task performance. To do so, participants in this 
experiment held the band with the hand contralateral to the hand carrying out the interval 
reproduction and agency task. If temporal binding is affected by general experience of 
physical effort, that need not be undertook as a necessary part of the action creating the 
cause-effect outcomes in the environment, then we expect to observe results similar to 
Experiment 1. That is, high task-unrelated effort reduces temporal binding between action 
and effect. Alternatively, if there is something action-specific about the nature of the effort – 
task-related compared with task-unrelated – then we may instead show a reverse pattern and 
replicate Demanet et al.’s (2013) finding of greater binding under high effort. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five participants (7 men; age range 18-54, M = 21.26, SD = 6.28) recruited 
from the University of East Anglia, completed the experiment in return for payment or course 
credit. Participants gave informed consent and were naïve as to the research question. As the 
experiment involved exertion while holding a latex exercise band, individuals with a latex 
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allergy, or back, neck, arm or shoulder pain were excluded from participation. No participants 
were excluded from participation due to this criteria.  
Apparatus, Design and Procedure 
The only alteration compared with Experiment 1 was that the resistance band was 
held in the left hand to allow for task-unrelated physical effort. Participants still responded to 
the interval reproduction task with their right hand, as in Experiment 1. The band was 
attached to a handrail fixed to the wall 94 cm from the ground on the left hand side of the 
participant. The band was pulled with the left hand towards the left side of the keyboard until 
the wrist was in line with the spacebar. The band was held in this position for the entire block 
of trials (see Figure 2 for effort manipulation set-up). 
Effort Manipulation Check. The effort manipulation was successful, as confirmed 
by the same analysis as in Experiment 1. The main effect of ‘Physical Effort’ was significant, 
F(1, 33) = 251.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .88 (High: M = 5.97, SD = 1.47; Low: M = 2.02, SD = .68). 
The main effect of “Time” was significant, F(1, 33) = 5.8, p = .022, ηp2 = .15, because effort 
ratings were higher after than before the experiment (M = 4.18, SD = .91; M = 3.81, SD = 
1.06, respectively). The interaction was also significant, F(1, 33) = 21.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .4, 
because the difference between high and low effort ratings was larger after the experiment 
than before (High: t(33) = 4.12 p < .001, dz = 0.71; Post M = 6.38, SD = 1.52, Pre M = 5.56, 
SD = 1.64; Low: t(33) = .55 p = .59, dz = 0.1; Post M = 1.97, SD = .8, Pre M = 2.06, SD = .85.  
Results 
A total of 0.55% of trials were removed as outliers. One participant was further 
removed for having extreme mean reproduction errors. The remaining data were submitted to 
the same analysis as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3). This revealed a main effect of “Presence 
of Agency”, F(1, 33) = 65.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, with larger reproduction errors during 
“Agency” compared with “No Agency” conditions (M = -273 ms, SD =189, and M = 24 ms, 
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SD = 252, respectively). The main effect of “Physical Effort” was also significant, F(1, 33) = 
5.03, p = .032, ηp2 = .13, with smaller reproduction errors under “High” than “Low” effort 
(M = -106 ms, SD = 205; M = -143 ms, SD = 198, respectively). Critically, and unlike 
Experiment 1, the interaction between these factors was also significant, F(1, 33) = 4.16, p 
= .049, ηp2 = .11. Planned contrasts revealed that in ”No Agency” conditions there was no 
difference between the effort conditions under “No Agency”, t(33) = .62, p = .542, dz = 0.11. 
Whereas, in “Agency” conditions “High” effort resulted in smaller reproduction errors 
compared with “Low” effort, t(33) = 2.94, p = .006, dz = 0.5.  
Similarly, to Experiment 1, we tested whether the difference between the effort 
participants stated that they exerted in the high vs. low effort conditions was related to the 
increase in binding difference between agency and no-agency conditions in the low effort 
condition relative to the high effort condition. The correlation was not significant whether the 
mean of the pre- and post-experiment ratings were used, r(32) = -.147, p = .407, or only the 
post-experiment ratings (p = .33). This stands in stark contrast to the findings of Experiment 
1 where there was a moderate and significant relationship between the two variables, 
whereby the effect of effort on implicit agency was related with the explicit ratings of 
exertion. The correlation coefficients from Experiment 1 (r =.523) and Experiment 2 (r = 
-.147 differ significantly from one another (z = 2.89, p = .004). 
As in Experiment 1, we investigated the effect of the factor ‘Time on Task’ to 
compare performance in the first half of the session with the second half. The three-way 
interaction was non-significant, F(1, 33) = 1.41, p =.24, ηp2 = .041, indicating that unlike 
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Experiment 1, the effect of effort on temporal binding was consistent through the 
experimental session.  
Discussion 
We again replicated the general finding of temporal binding under conditions of 
agency (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 2007; 
Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010), and this effect was weaker under high 
effort, even though the effort was task-unrelated. In Experiment 2, this effect of effort on 
binding was reliable at the group level (i.e. the critical effort by agency interaction was 
significant), but there was little role for individual appraisal of the subjective effort required, 
and was constant across the session, unlike in Experiment 1. Notably, our data are in the 
opposite pattern to that observed by Demanet et al. (2013). 
In Experiment 3, we aimed to explore whether the effect we observed in Experiment 2 
would replicate under conditions of a different type of effort, where no physical strain is 
required whatsoever. Instead, we note that the cognitive system is depleted similarly under 
physical and mental effort, and at least with our data, the effect of effort appears to be not 
completely action-specific. Therefore, we predict that high mental effort tasks will result in 
reduced binding in agency conditions, compared with low mental effort, replicating 
Experiment 2.  
Experiment 3: Mental effort 
In this experiment, participants were exposed to high and low levels of cognitive load, 
using a working memory task whereby items (2 or 8 for low and high effort levels, 
respectively) had to be kept in working memory during the stimulus interval and reproduction 
of this interval (adapted from Sternberg, 1966). If we again find that temporal binding is 
reduced under high (cognitive) effort, it would suggest that implicit sense of agency is 
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vulnerable under conditions of effort, regardless of the source. This would mirror the data of 
Hon et al. (2013) who found a similar pattern using an explicit ratings task. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants (6 men; age range 18-29, M = 20.39 SD = 2.05) recruited from 
the University of East Anglia, completed the experiment in return for payment or course 
credit. Participants gave informed consent and were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Experiment 3 examined the effect of cognitive load on temporal binding. To 
manipulate this, randomly selected letters (vowels and ‘y’ excluded, Arial font, font size 36, 
presented in white on a black background at encoding stage, and yellow font presented on a 
black background for probe letters) served as additional stimuli as part of the Sternberg 
(1966) memory task. Physical effort was not manipulated so the resistance exercise bands 
were not used in this experiment. Participants were tested in a group lab up to four 
participants at a time, but were separated in booths with no access to each other during the 
task. Stimuli were presented on a BenQ monitor (size: 24 inches; resolution: 1920 x 1080 
refresh rate: 60 Hz) Auditory stimuli were presented using Sony 7506 headphones. The Adult 
Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Cartwright, 2004) was also administered at the end of the 
testing session as part of a pilot study for an unrelated research question and so is not 
discussed further. 
Design 
In a repeated subjects design participants completed four experimental block types 
differing across two factors: “Presence of Agency” (“Agency” and “No Agency”) and 
cognitive load under the factor “Mental Effort” (“Low” and “High”). Sense of agency was 
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measured, as in Experiments 1 and 2, as reproduction errors (calculated as the subtraction of 
stimulus intervals from response intervals). “Reproduction Error Differential” was calculated 
as in Experiments 1 and 2. During the “Mental Effort” manipulation, memory accuracy 
performance was recorded, from which an “Accuracy Difference” was calculated as accuracy 
score (percentage accurate) under “Low Mental Effort” minus accuracy score under “High 
Mental Effort”. 
Procedure 
Effort manipulation. Mental effort was manipulated using the Sternberg (1966) 
Memory task, adapted to administer “Mental Effort” under “Low” and “High” levels of 
cognitive load. The Memory task consisted of an encoding stage, a maintenance period, and a 
recall stage. During the encoding stage a series of randomly selected letters were presented 
successively for 1000 ms each. For “Low” and “High” “Cognitive Load” conditions two and 
eight letters, respectively, were presented at the encoding stage. The Interval Reproduction 
task served as the maintenance period, which was followed by the recall stage. The recall 
stage consisted of a probe letter to which participants distinguished whether or not (pressing 
‘1’ and ‘2’, respectively) the probe was present at encoding, which was the case in 50% of 
trials (at random).  
Presence of Agency manipulation. Agency was manipulated as in Experiments 1 and 
2, using an Interval Reproduction task. Before starting the experiment participants completed 
a short block practicing the “Presence of Agency” and “Mental Effort” manipulations. Each 
experimental condition contained 36 trials which were presented in two blocks of 18 trials 
each. Blocks were separated by a self-paced rest period. The order of block type was 
counterbalanced as in Experiments 1 and 2. At the end of each block participants were 
encouraged to take an unrestrained rest period. The full experiment lasted approximately 45 
minutes (see Figure 5).  
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FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Cognitive Load Manipulation Check. Accuracy data percentages were analysed 
across the two factors (“Presence of Agency” and “Mental Effort”) using a 2 X 2 ANOVA. A 
main effect of “Mental Effort” was observed, F(1, 33) = 176.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .84, because 
participants recalled more accurately under low compared to high load (M = 92.28%, SD = 
5.9, and M = 72.39%, SD = 7.4). Neither main effect of “Presence of Agency”, nor the 
interaction between the two factors were significant, F’s<1. 
Results 
Data from one participant were removed because they omitted to perform responses 
during the working memory task. Trials with extreme reproduction errors were removed 
(0.54% of trials), as were trials in which responses in the recall stage were inaccurate 
(17.5%). One additional participant produced extreme interval reproduction scores and 
therefore was not submitted to further analysis. 
Mean reproduction errors for each participant in each condition were submitted to a 2 
(“Presence of Agency”) X 2 (“Mental Effort”) ANOVA, which revealed a significant main 
effect of “Presence of Agency”, F(1, 33) = 69.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .68), whereby “Agency” 
tasks had greater reproduction errors than “No Agency” tasks (M = -215 ms, SD = 253 and M 
= -22 ms, SD = 323 ms, respectively). There was no main effect of “Mental Effort”, F(1, 33) 
< 1, but the interaction was significant, F(1, 33) = 4.56, p = .04, ηp2 = .12. 
Planned contrasts examined the interaction revealing that for “No Agency” tasks there 
was no effect of effort, t(33) = .88, p = .39, dz = 0.149. However, for “Agency” tasks an effect 
of “Mental Effort” was observed, t(33) = 2.1, p = .044, dz = 0.36, whereby reproduction 
errors were greater under “Low” effort (see Figure 3). 
In this experiment, we did not ask participants to provide ratings of how much effort they 
exerted under high and low effort. Instead, we have the objective measure of their 
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performance as a proxy for effort. That is, an individual’s difference in accuracy between the 
high and low cognitive load conditions can be used as an index of how much more taxing the 
high load task was relative to the low, for each individual. Like before, this was correlated 
with the difference in the effect of agency between the high and low effort conditions. The 
correlation was not significant, r(33) = -.113, p = .523, and was significantly weaker than the 
significant positive correlation from Experiment 1 (z = 2.73, p = .006). As in Experiments 1 
and 2, we compared the performance on the first and second halves of the experiment with 
the factor ‘Time on Task’. The three-way interaction was non-significant, F(1, 33) < 1, 
meaning that the effect of effort on agency was consistent across the experiment session.  
Finally, we report here for completion a preliminary experiment we conducted before 
we ran Experiment 3. This differed from Experiment 3 in that the high load condition was not 
as taxing, using only a set size of 6 instead of 8. With this lower high set size, the critical 
effort x agency interaction was also significant, as in Experiment 3, F(1, 35) = 5.0, p = .03, 
ηp2 = .13, due to a weaker effect of agency under the high load condition. However, the 
contrast comparing temporal binding in the agency conditions did not differ significantly 
between high (-194ms) and low (-220ms) load (p = .12). We interpreted this as limited 
evidence for reduced implicit agency under cognitive load, and this motivated us to test a 
higher load level (8), which we presented here in full as Experiment 3.  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 aimed to determine effort effects in action-unrelated cognitive load on 
temporal binding. In addition to the basic temporal binding effect under conditions of agency, 
an interaction with effort was also observed. In conditions in which agency was present, high 
mental effort decreased temporal binding compared with low mental effort conditions. This 
effect of mental effort was not observed in conditions in which agency was absent. These 
effects on temporal binding therefore reflect those found for both action-related and –
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unrelated physical effort (Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). As in Experiment 2, here there 
was no modulatory role the individual experience of effort, nor of time on task, on the effect 
of effort on temporal binding. Taken together, the data we have collected using the cognitive 
load task shows that mental effort reduces temporal binding under conditions of agency, 
which is in line with that observed using explicit measures (Hon et al., 2013). 
General discussion 
The current study investigated the role of both physical and mental effort for the 
modulation of implicit sense of agency. Using an interval reproduction paradigm, the amount 
of temporal binding between events in an agentic context (a self-made action and a 
consequent tone) compared with events which were not agentically related (two tones), was 
measured. Interval reproductions that are shorter than the actual length of the interval 
represent temporal binding between the events, whereby the events are perceived as closer 
together - ‘bound’ - in time. This measure is thought to be a valid implicit measure of the 
degree of agency that the cognitive system ascribes to a given event (Engbert & 
Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012). In 
each experiment, we found temporal binding under conditions of agency, but not under 
passive conditions, replicating prior work (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert & 
Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; 
Moore & Obhi, 2012). Of critical interest was whether task-related (Experiment 1), task-
unrelated (Experiment 2) and mental (Experiment 3) effort would modulate this effect of 
agency on temporal interval reproduction. 
 Overall, our data revealed that in conditions of agency temporal binding was weaker 
under high, compared with low effort (however, note that for Experiment 1, the key 
interaction was non-significant). This effect was not observed for conditions absent of 
agency. In general terms, this effect was consistent across experiments and statistical effect 
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sizes were medium for the key interactions and correlations (Experiment 1 – key correlation r 
= .52; Experiment 2 – key interaction ηp2 = .11; Experiment 3 - key interaction ηp2 = .12) and 
small to medium for the key contrasts (Experiments 1-3 dz’s 0.26, 0.50, 0.36, respectively). It 
is also worth noting that the key interactions in Experiments 2 and 3 reached the 
conventional .05 p-value threshold by rather small margins, which suggests that although our 
sample size was calculated as sufficient to reveal the predicted effect sizes, future replication 
attempts may benefit from a larger sample to detect and confirm these small to medium 
statistical effect sizes.  
Potential mechanisms for reduced sense of agency under effort 
Here we found that high effort resulted in a perceived shortening of the time between 
actions and their consequences (in Experiment 1 this effect is modulated by the subjective 
experience of effort). Importantly, this effect was not observed for conditions in which 
agency was not present. A commonality across each of our experiments is that we can assume 
that in the high load conditions, they either directly (Experiment 3) or indirectly (Experiments 
1 and 2) draw on cognitive resources (Block et al., 2016). If we assume that agency ascription 
is itself cognitively costly, for reason we explain below, then under conditions of 
compromised cognitive resource availability, such as high effort, temporal binding would be 
weaker. This would be because there are less resources to dedicate to agency signal 
generation due to resource depletion during effort exertion. This would explain our data from 
Experiments 2 and 3, and somewhat the data from Experiment 1. Indeed, such reductions in 
temporal binding have been previously observed in conditions characteristic of cognitive 
conflict, such as coercion and negative social emotional consequences (Caspar et al., 2016; 
Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). 
Dual process accounts of cognitive and motor control also lend indirect support for 
this cognitive resource competition theory for sense of agency (Huxhold et al, 2006; Lacour 
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et al., 2008). Cognitive loading causes a reduction in balance and movement accuracy due to 
limited cognitive resource availability for motor awareness (Kannape et al., 2014; 
Lindenberger et al, 2000; Woollacott & Shumway-Cook, 2002). According to internal 
forward models of motor control, self-agency over an action occurs when motor predictions 
of the action and sensory consequences match (Blakemore et al., 2001; 2002). We propose 
that reductions in motor awareness caused by limited cognitive resources, disrupt the ability 
of the system to create accurate predictions concerning sensory effects and outcomes of 
willed actions. This then results in a diminished sense of agency. Therefore, when cognitive 
resources are challenged, in the current case, by mental or physical strain, resources are less 
available to generate accurate motor awareness, which in turn disrupts the ascription of self-
agency. The reduction of temporal binding under high effort in agency conditions in our 
experiments may be demonstrative of this mechanism.  
Action-specific effort effects 
Overall, our data suggest that there may be a general effect of effort on implicit sense 
of agency, whereby high effort reduces temporal binding. However for action specific effort 
(Experiment 1) this effect is dependent on the subjective experience of effort and effort 
induced fatigue. That is, for those under task-related effort, we find that the more effort 
experienced, either for individual differences in subjective effort experienced, or for task 
induced fatigue over time, the stronger the deleterious effect of high effort is on temporal 
binding. This modulation of individual appraisals of effort may endorse the cognitive 
resource depletion account that we suggest. Whereby, high effort, or - in the case of 
Experiment 1 - those who experience the action specific effort as highly effortful, depletes 
cognitive resources otherwise used for enhancing motor awareness and therefore disrupts 
agency ascription and temporal binding (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore et al., 2002; 
Kannape et al., 2014; Lindenberger et al, 2000; Woollacott & Shumway-Cook, 2002). 
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Subjective task difficulty has been shown to be related to effort expenditure (Ennis, Hess & 
Smith, 2013). Those who experienced the high task-related effort as less effortful would 
require less cognitive resources to maintain the effort manipulation. In these individuals, 
cognitive resources are available for motor awareness and agency ascription. This account 
explains both the correlation between the effect of effort on binding and the subjective 
experience of effort, and also the effect of time-on-task in Experiment 1. Interestingly, this 
effect is not observed in task-unrelated physical or mental effort. To explain this, we consider 
that when under task-unrelated effort, the effort manipulation may have an indirect but strong 
effect on the efficiency of the mechanism by which agency is ascribed which outweighs the 
role of individual experience of effort. This effect could be due to the dual task demands of 
processing the effort manipulation with one effector, and the action with another (Experiment 
2), which could be more demanding than processing input from a common source as in 
Experiment 1 (cf. Kahneman, 1973; Pashler, 1994).  
 Limitations and future work 
This investigation into the role of effort on sense of agency was in part designed to 
complement the work of Demanet et al. (2013). However, we found the opposite pattern of 
results compared with their study. Demanet et al. found that high task-unrelated effort 
resulted in greater temporal binding compared with low effort with the explanation that the 
sensation of effort acts as a cue inferring self-agency resulting in greater temporal binding. 
Demanet et al. used the ‘Libet clock’ method whereas we used interval reproduction as the 
implicit measure of agency. It is possible that the differences in the pattern of results may be 
due to methodological differences. The interval reproduction method captures the temporal 
relationship between the action and consequence and reflects the slowing of an internal clock 
(Wenke & Haggard, 2009), whereas the ‘Libet clock’ method captures the temporal 
positioning of either the action or consequence, and not the relationship between those two 
 EFFORT DISRUPTS IMPLICIT AGENCY  
 
 
30 
events, so reflects shifts in event perception. Although, it is not completely clear how these 
two methods would produce divergent results, so it is important that future work pursues this 
empirical question.  
Other work has indirectly investigated the role of cognitive resources on temporal 
binding as a measure for an implicit sense of agency, finding opposite effects in line with 
Demanet et al. (2013). Haggard and Cole (2007) investigated the role of focused attention on 
temporal binding. In the study participants’ attention was directed to one of two events, either 
towards the key press action or - in other trials - to the consequent tone. They found that 
focused attention on one event resulted in a perceptual event shift in a manner reflecting 
temporal binding that was stronger for the attended event. Another study that indirectly 
manipulated cognitive load also found increased temporal binding when the number of action 
choices was greater (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). The key differences between these two studies 
and ours are that we aimed to directly manipulate mental effort exerted during the task 
overall, and moreover, our manipulation was unrelated to the pertinent action, whereas 
Haggard and Cole directed mental effort to different aspects of the task itself, and Barlas and 
Obhi manipulated the difficulty of the task. Both these papers showed the opposite of what 
we report. However, we also note that Hon et al. (2013) showed that explicit agency is 
reduced – like our present finding with implicit agency – using a similarly non-task-focused 
manipulation of mental effort. It is therefore likely that the effect of mental effort on agency 
may critically depend on the source of the cognitive load. The current study did not asses 
hand dominance or individual levels of strength. These issues could be looked at in order to 
personalise and equivalate across effectors in investigations of task-related and unrelated 
physical effort. 
Future work could investigate the neural processing of events under conditions of 
agency and without agency while manipulating effort. The N1 event-related potential is 
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suppressed in response to events that the participant themselves has caused (Caspar et al., 
2016; Poonian, McFadyen, Ogden & Cunnington, 2015). This suppression is thought to index 
sense of agency due to top-down motor predictions causing a suppression of the processing of 
the effects of actions (Gentsch, Kathmann & Schutz-Bosbach, 2012). It is possible that under 
cognitive or physical strain, this neural marker for agency could be attenuated (i.e. less N1 
suppression). Indeed, under conditions that are arguably high in cognitive conflict (and 
therefore load), the N1 suppression is weaker (e.g. under coercion, Caspar et al., 2016).  
Everyday life consists of effortful actions, fatigue, strain, stress and multitasking. The 
current study suggests that individuals under these conditions may feel an impaired sense of 
agency for their actions. This could have implications for moral decision making and 
responsibility, especially in environments in which cognitive resources are challenged 
(Caspar et al., 2016). For instance, the feeling of responsibility for actions that lead to 
accidents may reduce under conditions of fatigue and stress. Indeed, this could be one 
mechanism by which the action monitoring system itself fails to provide adequate action 
control under fatigue/stress, leading to erroneous or negligent acts. This notion could have 
further implications for how the law manages responsibility for actions in the context of 
mental and physical fatigue. 
Finally, we consider the relationship between explicit and implicit measures of 
agency. We did not measure explicit agency ratings in this study. However, previous work has 
noted that high effort actions are associated with a greater feeling of will over action 
(Lafargue & Franck, 2009), whereas our data suggest that effort reduces implicit agency. 
Indeed, some authors have noted a dissociation between such measures, finding implicit 
agency measures and explicit judgments to be unrelated to one another (Dewey & Knoblich, 
2014; Obhi & Hall; 2011). This again suggests that different sources of cues (e.g. 
sensorimotor feedback, temporal binding, retrospective judgements of agency) may 
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contribute to the different levels of agency, and are themselves affected by different variables, 
accounting for dissociations between how responsible we can say we felt about an action 
compared with implicit measures. It could therefore be that manipulating effort in these 
paradigms could be a useful variable to explore the relationship between implicit and explicit 
measures of agency. 
Conclusion 
The present studies investigated the influence of physical and mental effort on 
temporal binding. It was found that the binding effect was reduced whilst under high effort in 
agentic conditions. It is concluded that effort generally and non-specifically affects implicit 
sense of agency, thought to be caused by depleted cognitive resources that would be 
otherwise dedicated to agency detection. When the effort is exerted by the same effector as 
that which is producing the environmental outcome, however, there is a more specific effect 
of effort whereby the individual’s subjective experience of effort is taken into account. These 
results therefore further imply that a sense of agency is not necessarily generated in a uniform 
manner for any given action. Rather, the current state of the motor or cognitive system can 
disrupt a key mechanism that provides feedback about our actions in the environment.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Procedure for the Interval Reproduction task. In each condition the first 
event consisted of either a key press (“Agency”) or a tone (“No Agency”). After a randomised 
stimulus interval (500-1500ms) the outcome, a tone, was presented. Participants were 
prompted to respond by recreating the interval between the first and second events with the 
depression of the spacebar. 
Figure 2. Effort manipulation set-up. Participants held the exercise band in their right 
hand for task-related physical effort (A), and in their left hand for task-unrelated physical 
effort (B). 
Figure 3. Mean reproduction errors across factors “Presence of Agency” and “Effort” 
for each Experiment. Bars extending below the x-axis reflect an underestimation of the 
stimulus interval (temporal binding). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for 
within-subject designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson 
(1994). Asterisks indicate significant contrasts at p<.05. 
Figure 4. The relationship between “Effort Rating Difference” and “Reproduction 
Error Differential”. As “Effort Rating Difference” increases “Reproduction Error 
Differential” increases. Cases with reproduction error differential values above zero are 
individuals who showed stronger effects of agency (vs. no agency) in low than high effort 
conditions. 
Figure 5. Procedure for Experiment 3: Participants were presented with a string of 
letters, either two (“Low” effort) or eight (“High” effort), after which the Interval 
Reproduction task started. The first event consisted of either a spacebar press (“Agency”) or a 
tone (“No Agency”). After a randomised stimulus interval (500-1500ms) the outcome, a tone, 
was presented. Participants were prompted to make response intervals by recreating the 
interval between the first event and outcome with the depression of the spacebar, after which 
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the probe letter appeared, prompting participants to respond as to whether it had appeared in 
the string at the encoding stage.
 Figure 1. 
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